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Abstract
An effective defense strategy requires aircraft, among other weapons systems, to be available and ready for use when cir-
cumstances deem necessary. This article offers a set of importance measures to identify the critical components in a sys-
tem from their influence on system-achieved availability, a common Department of Defense availability calculation that is
a ratio of mean time between maintenance and total system time, including mean maintenance time. With these mea-
sures, more effective maintenance plans, including inspection and supply inventory, can focus on those components that
more significantly impact achieved availability. A decision-making formulation results from these component importance
measures, and an example based on a US Air Force system illustrates the modeling contributions.
Keywords
Achieved availability, reliability-centered maintenance, component importance measure, inspections
Date received: 12 May 2014; accepted: 18 August 2014
Introduction and motivation
The Department of Defense (DoD)1 uses three main
metrics to measure the quality of one of its systems:
reliability, maintainability, and availability. Particularly
within the US Air Force, high-quality aircraft equip-
ment requires high-performance values for all three
metrics: reliable (ability to last as long as intended) and
maintainable (ability to be fixed with minimum effort
and time) to make the aircraft equipment available
(accessible when needed). Availability, or the probabil-
ity that a system is performing its required function at a
given point in time when operated and maintained in a
prescribed manner,2 is perhaps the key metric of the
three.
The availability of DoD systems is threatened by
obsolescence. For example in the US Air Force, the
cost to replace over 500 KC-135s, which debuted in the
mid-1950s, has been estimated in the tens of billions of
dollars with a replacement plan lasting for several
decades.3 A budget reduction of about 29% since 1990
has ‘‘forced the branches of the military to extend the
life of current legacy systems with significant reductions
in new acquisitions of replacement systems.’’4 Such new
purchases are usually restricted due to funding limita-
tions, making redesigning or generating redundancy for
improved reliability not an option.5,6 As such, the only
remaining option to improve system availability is to
enhance the maintenance methods during sustainment
of the system. This leads to the need for an optimal
maintenance policy to have the maximum positive
impact on availability.7,8
Recent DoD focus has been directed toward improv-
ing the decision-making process for system sustain-
ment, including maintenance, repair, and overhaul
(MRO) operations and the acquisition of MRO parts.
MRO depot resources must be dynamically assigned
to reflect changes in priority driven by critical supply
needs and internal parts’ shortages with the goal of
reducing cost and lead times, meeting due dates, and
maximizing availability of DoD weapon systems.
Streamlined MRO activities, including the scheduling
of system maintenance, the acquisition of parts (e.g.
spare part shortages have been a concern in the
DoD9), and the optimal performance of supply chain
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operations, is key to keeping these aging systems
available.
One means to tighten MRO costs is to focus on a
primary set of components that most affect system per-
formance. The analysis of systems, regardless of
domain, often includes determining which system com-
ponents are most influential on the performance of the
system. Given the context above, the task of detecting
the system, subsystem, or component on which to focus
efforts (e.g. MRO activities) to gain the most improve-
ment (e.g. improved availability) for the least cost is an
important one. Component importance measures
(CIMs), a well-studied topic in reliability engineering,10
measure the influence of particular components on the
reliability of an overall system.
In a couple of recent theoretical exercises, impor-
tance measures have been developed to focus on avail-
ability metrics to determine the component in a system
that most influences overall system availability.11,12
This article extends this recent work by (1) analyzing
availability-based component importance for some
specific reliability and maintainability metrics that
comprise achieved availability, an important DoD
metric and (2) proposing a simple decision-making
formulation to highlight how inspections can impact
availability for those components found to be most
impactful to the system. Subsequent sections of this
paper provide methodological background to the
availability-based importance measure for achieved
availability, a DoD-inspired illustrative example, and
concluding remarks.
Background and literature review
Advancing technology and tighter budgets have
prompted the desire to avoid failures before they
occur, broadly referred to as preventive maintenance
(PM). There remained a desire to do more for less—
more availability and reliability with focus on safety
and environmental impacts while keeping budgets to
a minimum—ultimately leading to the philosophy of
reliability-centered maintenance (RCM).13 Those who
plan on using RCM do so because they expect to gain
longer availability times, lower costs, and better
control and decisions.14 With the idea of RCM in
mind, we review background on calculations for com-
ponent and system availability, as well as importance
measures.
Availability classification and quantification
The reliability, availability, and maintainability perfor-
mance metrics of a system have fundamental relation-
ships. Given our interests in DoD1 weapons systems in
particular, we examine the similarity and differences
among the DoD definitions of these system perfor-
mance metrics:
 Reliability is the probability that an item can per-
form its intended function(s) without failure for a
specified time under stated conditions.
 Availability is a measure of the degree to which an
item is in an operable state and can be committed at
the start of a mission when the mission is called for
at an unknown (random) point in time.
 Maintainability is the probability that an item can
be retained in, or restored to, a specified condition
in a given time when maintenance is performed by
personnel having specified skill levels, using pre-
scribed procedures and resources, at each pre-
scribed level of maintenance and repair.
Reliability is a metric that is often optimized during
a system’s design phase, where system configurations
and component redundancies are considered to maxi-
mize system reliability or related mean time to failure
metrics. However, after the design phase is completed,
there is often no further action possible with the existing
components to improve their reliability. As reliability as
a metric does not account for maintenance considera-
tions, availability is a more suitable metric to measure
the effectiveness of an existing system. Furthermore,
availability can be improved in an existing system
through improved maintainability when the reliability
values are not realized according to the manufacturer’s
specifications.15
There are several definitions of availability depend-
ing on the user’s point of view. All such definitions use
equation (1) as a baseline, which essentially provides a
probability of the system being operational. The vari-
ous availability definitions differ in how they define
what is included in the uptime and downtime para-
meters. The three most common categories of availabil-
ity are inherent availability, achieved availability, and
operational availability16
availability=
uptime
uptime+downtime
ð1Þ
Inherent availability (Ai) is the most commonly used
availability measurement. Inherent availability uses the
component’s or system’s mean time between failures
(MTBF) as the uptime measure and mean time to repair
(MTTR) as the downtime measure. MTTR includes
only corrective maintenance (CM) downtime. The Ai
parameters initially come from the specifications in the
manufacturer’s report on how long the system is pro-
jected to operate before failure and how long it takes a
normal maintenance team to repair a failed unit.
Operational availability (Ao) is the best measure of
the ‘‘realistic’’ availability a user of a system actually
experiences over a period of time. This is because Ao is
based on the collection of all the actual events that
occur to the system during any system downtime until
the system is once again fully restored. It includes
uptime as the mean time between maintenance
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(MTBM) actions and an additional term for ready time
(RT), assuming the system is operational even if it is
offline. The operational cycle is the total time being
considered for the system. For the downtime para-
meter, Ao defines mean down time (MDT) with an
expanded definition of the time to repair the system
plus the delay time (DT). The significant aspect of the
MDT is that it includes administrative and logistic
delays, while the system is down, and the system’s
mean maintenance time (M).16
Achieved availability (Aa) is the measure that the
maintenance department would most often be tracking
as a department performance measure of both the sys-
tems they maintain and the department capacity to
maintain them, as it is based on both the actual mainte-
nance touch time and the equipment’s failure activity.
The Aa definition and equation uses MTBM and M as
its parameters. Achieved availability for a system with
n components is calculated in equation (2)16
Aa =
MTBM
MTBM+M
ð2Þ
Aa includes both CM actions, in the form of system
failures, and PM actions that take the system offline, in
the form of system downing PMs
MTBM=
Total uptime
# of system failures+# of systemdowningPMs
ð3Þ
M=
CMdowntime+PMdowntime
# of system failures+# of systemdowningPMs
ð4Þ
The weakness of Ai is that it does not include the
PM parameter incorporated into the calculation. The
weakness of Ao is that it is convoluted with many other
logistics and administrative parameters and delays. The
conclusion is that neither of these first two availability
calculations are well suited for focusing on maintenance
impacts to availability. Aa is the most appropriate for
this study as it incorporates PM and inspections can be
split out of PM to analyze their core impact on Aa.
Importance measures
It is very rare that systems are simplistic enough to have
a minimum amount of components that would allow
equal attention or worth to be given to all components.
This is particularly true in the case of DoD weapons
systems, which are often highly complex. Such systems
lend themselves to allocate resources by dividing the
system up into subsystems or collections of subsystems
based on how important that subsystem is to the over-
all system. Then each subsystem can be more easily
analyzed at the component level. The importance of
each component to the subsystem can be measured and
then the component’s importance related to the overall
aircraft.
Many CIMs have been developed to determine the
criticality of individual components to system perfor-
mance.17 Primarily, importance measures have been
introduced to measure the influence of particular com-
ponents on the overall reliability of the system.18,19
Specific CIMs include risk reduction worth (RRW), an
index that quantifies the potential damage to a system
caused by a particular component failure, and the relia-
bility achievement worth (RAW) of a component, or
the maximum proportion increase in system reliability
generated by that component.20
This work will focus on the Birnbaum importance
measure, among the most widely used importance mea-
sures in reliability engineering.21 For a system of n compo-
nents, the Birnbaum22 importance measure has historically
measured how the change in reliability of component i
influences a change in the reliability of the system, or
IBi = ∂Rs=∂Ri. After the I
B
i factor for each component is
computed, the component with the largest IBi value is the
component that will offer the greatest improvement in sys-
tem reliability when its reliability is improved.
Both Cassady et al.11 and Barabady and Kumar12
adapted the IBi concept to propose an availability
importance measure based on inherent availability.
Their availability importance measures, in equation (5),
demonstrates how the inherent availability of the sys-
tem is influenced by the inherent availability of a sub-
system or component. In their equations, As is the
system availability and Ai is the component availability
for component i
IAi =
∂As
∂Ai
ð5Þ
Similar to Birnbaum reliability importance, the
change in the component availability that will have the
greatest impact on the reliability of the system is from
the IAi with the largest value. This article also extends
the Birnbaum reliability importance measures to avail-
ability, but in this article it is based on Aa, considered
to be a much more appropriate maintenance-centered
availability measure. Furthermore, we focus on impor-
tance relative to MTBM and M measures.
System configurations and their availability measures
This article addresses the four primary system config-
urations depicted in Figure 1: series, parallel, series-par-
allel, and parallel-series. For these four system
configurations, the notation for achieved availability is
as follows: ASa for series systems, A
P
a for parallel sys-
tems, ASPa for series-parallel, and A
PS
a for parallel-series.
For a series-only combination of components, the sub-
script i represents any one of the n individual compo-
nents in the series system. For parallel configurations,
the subscript j refers to any one of the m individual
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parallel components of the parallel system or subsys-
tem. For the series-parallel and parallel-series combina-
tion, the achieved availability notation includes either ij
or ji to represent the individual components of the
respective systems. The achieved availability calcula-
tions for particular system configurations are variants
of the general form in equation (2).
Series systems. Figure 1(a) depicts a system comprised
of n independent components in series. For this system
to be available, each independent component must be
operable. The steady-state availability for a series sys-
tem is the product of the independent component avail-
abilities. Therefore, the system availability, ASa found in
equation (6), will be smaller than the smallest compo-
nent’s availability2
ASa =
Yn
i=1
Aai =
Yn
i=1
MTBMi
MTBMi+Mi
ð6Þ
Parallel systems. Figure 1(b) depicts a system comprised
of m independent components connected in parallel. In
order for this system to be unavailable, every indepen-
dent component must be inoperable. This configuration
can often be found when a system is critical to the oper-
ation of a weapons system (e.g. safety of flight for an
aircraft). The APa is found in equation (7) as the prob-
ability that at least one component is not unavailable2
APa =
am
j=1
Aaj =
am
j=1
MTBMj
MTBMj+Mj
=1
Ym
j=1
1 MTBMj
MTBMj+Mj
  ð7Þ
Series-parallel systems. A series-parallel system, depicted
in Figure 1(c), is comprised of n independent
subsystems connected in series, where each subsystem
consists of m components in parallel. This is one of the
more complicated systems but is also among the more
common situations for a high-risk system (e.g. DoD
aircraft). The redundancy allows some of the
individual components to not be available and the sys-
tem to still be available as long as at least one compo-
nent in every subsystem is available. The achieved
availability for this configuration is provided in
equation (8)
ASPa =
Yn
i=1
am
j=1
Aaij
" #
=
Yn
i=1
1
Ym
j=1
1 MTBMij
MTBMij+Mij
 " # ð8Þ
Parallel-series systems. A parallel-series system, shown in
Figure 1(d), is a system comprised of m independent
subsystems connected in parallel, where each subsystem
consists of n components in a series configuration. A
parallel-series system configuration allows for multiple
components to not be available, as long as all the com-
ponents in one of the subsystems are still available.
Such a system configuration is especially useful in
describing the subsystems of an aircraft system, illu-
strated subsequently. The achieved availability in terms
of the MTBM and M metrics of individual components
is found in equation (9)
APSa =
am
j=1
Yn
i=1
Aaji
 !
=1
Ym
j=1
1
Yn
i=1
MTBMji
MTBMji+Mji
 ! ð9Þ
Figure 1. Four primary configurations that describe the structure of most systems: (a) series, (b) parallel, (c) series-parallel, and
(d) parallel-series.
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Achieved availability importance
measures
Throughout this article, independence is assumed for
all the components of a system, suggesting that the fail-
ure of one component does not have an effect on the
other components. However, depending on the config-
uration of the system, the system may be either in a
failed or working state. Assumptions for all systems are
as follows, adapted from Cassady et al.,11 and
Barabady and Kumar:12
 The system is in steady state.
 Each system comprises components whose failures
are independent.
 All components are repairable, which returns the
component to an as good as new state.
 Each component and system has two states: work-
ing or down, where ‘‘down’’ includes inoperability
due to failure and maintenance.
This section extends the Birnbaum importance mea-
sure with three importance measures, motivated by the
approaches of Cassady et al.11 and Barabady and
Kumar12 but specifically (1) adapting achieved availabil-
ity and (2) constructing two new improvement measures
based on MTBM and M. The first importance measure
is the achieved availability importance measure for the
component and can be calculated when i can equal j, ij,
or ji, depending on the system configuration. Aa is the
system-achieved availability and Aai is the ith compo-
nent’s achieved availability, and the achieved availability
importance measure Iai is found in equation(10)
Iai =
∂Aa
∂Aai
ð10Þ
The other two importance measures are based on
the availability of the system, with respect to the
MTBM and M parameters. These two importance
measures are referred to here as MTBM importance
andM importance.
The achieved availability importance measure with
respect to the MTBM highlights how the MTBM, a
surrogate measure of reliability, of component i impacts
the availability of the system. Provided in equation
(11), the component with the largest value of Ia,MTBMi
indicates that it has the largest effect on the availability
for the system
Ia,MTBMi =
∂Aa
∂MTBMi
=
∂Aa
∂Aai
3
∂Aai
∂MTBMi
ð11Þ
The M importance measure highlights how the mean
maintenance time of component i impacts the availabil-
ity of the entire system. The M of a component is a sur-
rogate measure describing its maintainability. When
evaluating equation (12), the Ia,Mi resulting values are
negative (as smaller values of M result in larger values
of system availability). Since the goal of the importance
analysis is to find the component that has the largest
Ia,Mi magnitude to determine the speed of which it
changes, only the absolute values of the results of equa-
tion (12) are considered in the subsequent graphical
comparisons of the values
Ia,Mi =
∂Aa
∂Mi
=
∂Aa
∂Aai
3
∂Aai
∂Mi
ð12Þ
Explicitly highlighting the contributions of MTBM
and M in equation (5) allows us to pinpoint which
component of availability to concentrate on for the
most important components: improve reliability (e.g.
through supplier selection) or improve maintainability
(e.g. through MRO on-hand inventory).
Characteristically, the MTBM is a much greater
value than the M. When that is the case, Ia,Mi will be
much greater than Ia,MTBMi suggesting that finding
ways to decrease the component’s M offers a greater
benefit to the system availability than working on the
component’s MTBM. However, the cost and effort
required to decrease M may be more significant than
what is required to increase the MTBM value.
Depending on the MTBM and M values, the reverse
situation could also be possible as well. To be certain
the initial maintenance focus is on the correct para-
meter as determined by these additional importance
measures, both the Ia,MTBMi and the Ia,Mi should
always be calculated.
Aa importance measures for a series system
From equation (6), the achieved availability importance
measure is found in equation (13) for a series system
ISai =
∂ASa
∂Aai
=
Y
k6¼i
Aak ð13Þ
The MTBM importance and M importance are com-
puted for the target component in the series system,
shown in equations (14) and (15), respectively
ISa,Mi = I
S
ai
3
∂Aai
∂Mi
=
∂ASa
∂Aai
3
∂Aai
∂Mi
=ASa 3
1
MTBMi+Mið Þ
ð14Þ
ISa,MTBMi =
∂ASa
∂Aai
3
∂Aai
∂MTBMi
= ISai 3
∂Aai
∂MTBMi
=ASa 3
Mi
MTBMi(MTBMi+Mi)
ð15Þ
Aa importance measures for a parallel system
From the definition of parallel system–achieved avail-
ability in equation (7), the associated importance mea-
sure, IPaj , is provided in equation (16)
IPaj =
∂APa
∂Aaj
=1
Y
l6¼j
(1 Aa, l) ð16Þ
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With equations (17) and (18), respectively, the
MTBM and M importance measures can be further
computed for the target component in a parallel system
IPa,MTBMj =
∂APa
∂Aaj
3
∂Aaj
∂MTBMj
= 1
Y
l6¼j
1 Aalð Þ
" #
3
Mj
MTBMj(MTBMj+Mj)
3Aaj
ð17Þ
IPa,Mj =
∂APa
∂Aaj
3
∂Aaj
∂Mj
= 1
Y
l6¼j
1 Aalð Þ
" #
3
1
(MTBMj+Mj)
3Aaj
ð18Þ
Aa importance measures for a series-parallel system
Equation (19) illustrates the impact of the achieved
availability ijth component on the system-achieved
availability for a series-parallel system. Priority of rank-
ing of which component to start with, in terms of best
choice for increasing the system availability, should be
assigned to component ij with the maximum ISPaij . Focus
is given to the impact of MTBM and M to system-
achieved availability with equations (20) and (21)
ISPaij =
∂ASPa
∂Aaij
=
Y
k6¼i
1
Ym
l=1
1 Aaklð Þ
" #
3
Y
l6¼j
1 Aailð Þ
ð19Þ
ISPa,MTBMij =
∂ASPa
∂Aaij
3
∂Aaij
∂MTBMij
= ISPaij 3
Mij
MTBMij(MTBMij+Mij)
3Aaij
ð20Þ
ISPa,Mij =
∂ASPa
∂Aaij
3
∂Aaij
∂Mij
= ISPaij 3
1
(MTBMij+Mij)
3Aaij
ð21Þ
Aa importance measures for a parallel-series system
From the achieved availability calculation for a
parallel-series system in equation (9), the importance
measure for component ji achieved availability pro-
vided in equation (22) is used to compute the achieved
availability importance measures for a parallel-series
system
IPSaji =
∂APSa
∂Aaji
=
Y
l6¼i
1
Yn
k= j
Aalk
" #
3
Y
k 6¼j
Aajk ð22Þ
The MTBM and M importance measures are com-
puted for the target component in a parallel-series sys-
tem in equations (23) and (24)
IPSa,MTBMji =
∂APSa
∂Aaji
3
∂Aaji
∂MTBMji
= IPSaji 3
Mji
MTBMji(MTBMji+Mji)
3Aaji
ð23Þ
IPSa,Mji =
∂APSa
∂Aaji
3
∂Aaji
∂Mji
= IPSaji 3
1
(MTBMji+Mji)
3Aaji ð24Þ
Illustrative examples: modeling the
impact of inspections
An inspection decision-making framework motivated
by the achieved availability importance measures is
provided in this section, wherein we identify the compo-
nents that have the largest magnitude importance mea-
sure and also maximize the system-achieved availability
for each system by allowing the adjustment of the num-
ber of inspections for each component. The four system
configurations are illustrated with an example inspired
by the components of an aircraft.
Aa importance measure decision-making framework
Often MTBM and M measures do not differentiate
between PM actions (the physical activity required to
performance PM) and inspection actions (which may
or may not result in PM actions depending on the
result of the inspection). As a primary objective of this
IM-inspired framework is to assist in determining the
frequency of inspections, the difference between PM
and inspection should be explicit. As such, the calcula-
tions of MTBM in equation (3) and M in equation (4)
are modified with equations (25) and (26) by separating
out the parameter ‘‘# of Inspections’’ in the denomina-
tors of both equations and the parameter ‘‘Inspection
Time’’ in the numerator of equation (26). Note that the
effect of decreasing the number of inspections in equa-
tions (25) and (26) is an increase the inspection interval
MTBM=
Total uptime
# ofCMs+# of PMs+# of Inspections
ð25Þ
M=
CMdowntime+PMdowntime+Inspection time
# ofCMs+# of PMs+# of Inspections
ð26Þ
Recall the basic availability formula in equation (1),
the ratio of uptime to uptime + downtime. To maximize
availability, either uptime has to be maximized or
downtime has to be minimized. Downtime, the numera-
tor in equation (26), can be expressed with equation
(27), where nCM, nPM, and nI refer to the numbers of
CM, PM, and inspection actions, respectively, and
yCM, yPM, and yI refer to the mean downtime for those
actions. The total downtime for CM is nCMyCM, the
total downtime for PM is nPMyPM, and the total down-
time for the inspection is nIyI
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downtime= nCMyCM+ nPMyPM+ nIyI ð27Þ
For those components deemed important to avail-
ability by the importance measures above, particularly
those important to the mean downtime metric, M, the
optimal number of inspections to improve availability
is determined with the conceptual optimization problem
found in equation (28) for component i. To accommo-
date for inspection-related decisions, the CM downtime
and PM downtime calculations are modified. Two new
parameters are introduced: P is the number of inspec-
tions before a replacement is done, and C is a propor-
tional multiplier to be applied to the repair time to
determine the replacement time. In addition, revisions
from equation (27) include these new two new para-
meters to account for inspection-related decisions. CM
downtime is impacted when an inspection action occurs
by avoiding a failure and instead doing a replacement,
indicating a modification to the time associated with a
replacement instead of a repair. Furthermore, a repair
time for CM is avoided, thus adding an additional mod-
ification to the equation. Finally, a reduction of one
PM action occurs when avoiding a failure. In typical
maintenance environments, all variables would be set
values for equation (28) and assumed for a steady-state
system
min
nIi
nPMi 
nIi
P
 
yCMi + CyCMi 
nIi
P
 
+ nPMi 
nIi
P
 
yPMi + nIiyIið Þs:t:nIi50 ð28Þ
all other parameters nCMi , nPMi , yCMi , yPMi , yIi50,
04C41, 04P41.
The ranking of components according to their avail-
ability importance measures produces a lexicographi-
cally ordered maximum value set, of which i is a
member. The optimization problem in equation (28)
could be performed for multiple components in this set,
or an optimization problem could be designed to
account for the inspection of multiple components
simultaneously if applicable.
Illustrative example background: aircraft
maintenance
Field aircraft maintenance data were acquired to illus-
trate the application of all the different example sys-
tems by applying the data in the decision-making
framework for the different achieved availability
importance measures to each appropriate system. Note
that a random factor was applied to the raw data to
mask the aircraft from which the data were derived and
also the component names are not used. However, pro-
portional relationships among components and the
overall performance parameters are still reasonably
characteristic in the resulting component priority pre-
dictions made by the CIM determinations.
The data were collected for a parallel-series system
that comprises a parallel system made up of four
subsystems, with each subsystem a series configura-
tion with three components. The individual compo-
nent names are referred to as Component 11,
Component 12,., Component ji because the actual
configuration is in parallel-series. This scenario is
depicted in Figure 2.
Data were collected for a 1-year period (potential
maximum total uptime time of 8760 h) from field air-
craft and are used for the illustration and analysis sec-
tions of this article. The data representing the variables
in equation (28), shown in Table 1, include the number
of and downtime length for CM actions, the number of
and downtime length for PM actions, and the number
of and downtime length for inspections.
The inspection that provides the insight to replace
the component before it fails is called the ‘‘critical’’
inspection. The actual number of inspections needed
before the critical inspection occurs would be deter-
mined by the historical inspection data and communi-
cating with maintenance analysts. It is assumed that
the number of inspections added before the critical
inspection yields an accurate failure prediction is a fully
adjustable parameter for each component.
The amount of time that a replacement takes is also
a parameter in the decision-making framework to allow
variation in different component experiences. When a
component is replaced, as determined by the critical
inspection, the mean replacement time is used in place
of the mean failure time and the CM and PM counts
are reduced by one event. This assumption is realistic
because after the replacement of a component, CM,
and PM would not be performed on the brand new
equipment.
Subsets of this aircraft illustrative example will be
used to illustrate a series subsystem configuration and
the actual parallel-series configuration of Figure 2.
Aa framework example: series system
The data chosen from Table 1 for the series system
describe Components 11, 12, and 13, comprising the
Figure 2. Diagram of the parallel-series aircraft system
configuration.
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first of the four series subsystem. Figure 3 depicts each
of the individual component availabilities and the sys-
tem availability, all shaded in gray. The ISai for each
component is shown in black. Note the different verti-
cal axes: the trend of the relationship between the two
calculations is of greater interest. As expected for a
series system, the component with the least availability
is the component with the largest system importance
measures. From the calculation of the importance mea-
sures, it is seen that Component 13 becomes the clear
choice with the highest priority component to focus
improvement efforts: the more available Component 13
becomes, the more available the system becomes.
Now that Component 13 has been identified, the
next step is to make a comparison between ISa,MTBMi
and ISa,Mi for Component 13 to further determine which
of these parameters can provide the greatest positive
impact on the system availability. This comparison is
shown in Figure 4, which depicts that the ISa,Mi is greater
compared to ISa,MTBMi . This suggests that improving M,
or improving the maintainability of the component, for
Component 13 provides most improvement for system
availability.
Given that Component 13 and the M parameter
have been identified as having most impact on system
availability, equation (28) is deployed in a discrete form
to determine the number of inspections for each com-
ponent (taken individually) to further influence system
availability. Figure 5 provides something of a sensitiv-
ity analysis, varying each component individually while
increasing the number of inspections to visualize the
impact to the system availability. Figure 5 shows that,
indeed, Component 13 has the fastest and greatest
impact on the system. When the inspections are
increased for Component 13, it provides the greatest
opportunity to increase system availability up to 14
inspections. After that, the downtime attributed to
Table 1. CM, PM, and inspection data for the aircraft system (time measured in hours).
Component No. of CM down Time per CM No. of PM down Time per PM No. of inspections Time per inspection
ji nCM yCM nPM yPM nI yI
11 10 1.59 46 3.66 7 9.78
12 12 13.31 41 4.03 7 9.78
13 19 2.81 53 4.09 7 9.78
21 22 2.88 60 5.58 9 8.16
22 15 4.63 80 6.76 5 1.47
23 20 5.27 66 9.67 5 1.70
31 20 5.74 75 6.60 7 3.95
32 10 5.10 73 5.94 7 2.13
33 15 43.01 29 15.13 3 24.14
41 10 37.74 19 15.04 3 8.93
42 14 47.47 26 14.59 5 19.04
43 10 53.47 19 16.91 3 24.14
CM: corrective maintenance; PM: preventive maintenance.
Figure 4. Comparing MTBM and M importance for
Component 13.
MTBM: mean time between maintenance; M: mean maintenance time.
Figure 3. Availability and Aa importance for components in the
series subsystem.
Figure 5. Series subsystem Aa sensitivity analysis.
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inspections outweighs the downtime due to potential
CM actions.
Notice, Component 11 actually shows a negative
impact on the system availability while increasing
inspections. This is due to the inspection time for
Component 11 being significantly longer than the
replace or repair time. This points out an area for a
maintenance process improvement, as an inspection
likely should not take such an amount of time that the
system cannot benefit from an inspection.
All these steps and analysis can now be repeated for
the remainder of the system configurations. What was
intuitively predictable for a series system without the
use of importance measure computations becomes
untenable for the more complex configurations, only
with the computations, charts, and graphs does it
become immediately possible to make the same type of
results and optimal predictions for the systems.
Aa framework example: parallel-series system
A series-parallel illustration is not provided, as the
example in Figure 2 does not readily lend itself to such
an application. Focus is given to the actual configura-
tion in Figure 2, the parallel-series system, which is not
featured in the work of Barabady and Kumar.12 No
changes to the structure of the data in Table 1 were
made for this illustration.
Figure 6 shows the individual component availabil-
ities and system availability in gray, with the IPSaji mea-
sures for each component in black. The component
with the largest IPSaji is shown as Component 13, which
is prioritized as the first to focus improvement efforts.
However, there are other components with IPSaji values
that are nearly the same magnitude and could also be
under consideration for improvement, including
Components 43 and 33. These components should be
ranked in priority, and other factors (e.g. budget, man-
power, space constraints) not chosen in this analysis
could change the lexicographic order of these highly
ranked components. The following analysis will focus
on the highest ranked, Component 13.
A comparison for Component 13 between IPSa,MTBMji
and IPSa,Mji further determines which parameter can have
the greatest impact on the system. This comparison is
done in the chart in Figure 7, which suggests
Component 13 shows the IPSa,MTBMji is the one with the
larger magnitude. Thus, an improvement on the
MTBM for Component 13 would be expected to yield
a greater impact on the system availability with the less
effort. This implies that the system is down more than
it is up. Consider looking into a potential issue with the
reliability causing extremely high failures or the mainte-
nance techniques are taking an excessive amount of
time.
Figure 8 provides the sensitivity implementation of
equation (28) examining each component individually
while increasing the inspections to see the impact to sys-
tem availability.
Figure 8 shows that Component 33 reaches the high-
est system-achieved availability with critical inspections
at inspection 14. Component 23 is the second highest,
but takes fewer added inspections to reach its maximum
impact to the system. Figure 8 indicates the third com-
ponent for each subsystem (Components 13, 23, 33,
and 43) as the components that can impact the system-
achieved availability the greatest with critical
Figure 8. Parallel-series system Aa sensitivity analysis.
Figure 7. Comparing MTBM and M importance for
Component 13.
MTBM: mean time between maintenance; M: mean maintenance time.
Figure 6. Availability and Aa importance for components in the
entire parallel-series system.
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inspections added. This has implications for the partic-
ular aircraft example.
Concluding remarks
This article presents a means to (1) extend existing
availability importance measures to include the effects
of maintenance activity, (2) determine the number of
inspections to obtain the maximum system-achieved
availability, and (3) apply this new availability impor-
tance measure tied to the optimal inspection frequency
within an RCM decision-making framework.
The availability-based framework has proven to be
very useful to allow data to drive decisions when
improving the achieved availability of a sample system.
The importance measure is a deterministic objective
measure that reports the status of the component, in
particular, using achieved availability as its basis mea-
sure. It then points to the component that has the most
opportunity for improvement, further identifying
whether the MTBM or M parameter needs the most
work for the system availability to improve. Each result
is dependent on the status of all the components in the
system and identifies directly the one that needs
improvement. Otherwise, time and money can easily be
wasted by putting efforts into something that could
result in a reduced system-achieved availability.
An ideal realm to execute the findings of the
decision-making framework is RCM. The main objec-
tive of RCM is to be used for determining optimal fail-
ure management tactics, to include maintenance
policies and provide proof for results from maintenance
tasks.8 The illustrative decision-making framework
results assist by allowing data to efficiently and effec-
tively drive decisions to accomplish the RCM objective.
Further work lies in applying a simulation-based
approach to determining the availability-based impor-
tance of the components in more complex structures,
paralleling the analytical approach in this article.
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